This paper studies a decentralized, dynamic matching and bargaining market: buyers and sellers are matched into pairs. Traders exit the market at a constant rate, inducing search costs (frictions). All price o¤ers are made by sellers. Despite the fact that sellers have all the bargaining power we show that they set competitive prices in the limit when frictions become small. Previous literature has restricted the sellers'bargaining power. We dispense with this restriction and show that the convergence result does not depend on the distribution of bargaining power. Our model allows us to isolate basic market clearing forces that ensure the competitive outcome in the frictionless limit.
Introduction
It is a common claim that decentralized markets clear and become e¢ cient as frictions vanish. Decentralized markets include the markets for housing, used cars, and labor.
Economists often refer to the following informal story as an explanation: Suppose prices in a market are constantly too high. Then some sellers must be rationed and trade less than they desire. This gives them an incentive to decrease their price in order to increase the trading volume, since doing so makes the o¤er acceptable to more buyers.
This incentive makes it impossible to have an equilibrium in which prices are too high to clear the market.
The story relies only on two components: the rationing of sellers and the elasticity of demand. The purpose of the present paper is to isolate these two factors behind the convergence results. We want to di¤erentiate them from additional factors that can be favorable to a competitive outcome. In particular, in the existing literature, the bargaining power of sellers is limited by either allowing buyers to make price o¤ers themselves or by letting several sellers compete against each other (see the discussion of the literature in Section 5.2). By dispensing with these additional assumptions, we provide a more powerful limit result. In addition, we can single out basic market clearing forces as the main factors of the convergence result.
This study uses a dynamic matching and bargaining game that is similar to the model by Gale (1987) sellers and all buyers from the pool are matched into pairs. In each pair, the seller makes a price o¤er to the buyer. If the buyer accepts the price, they trade and the pair exits the market. If the buyer declines, the match is broken and both traders return to the pool and wait to be rematched with new partners in the next period. While waiting, traders exit with a constant hazard rate . The hazard rate introduces costs of waiting for better o¤ers, and we say that is the friction in the market. At the end of every period, an equal mass of new buyers and new sellers enters the market. This in ‡ow of new traders is constant over all periods.
Let p w be de…ned as the price at which the mass of entering sellers with costs below p w is equal to the mass of entering buyers with valuations above p w . This price is the competitive or the market clearing price relative to the in ‡ow. The trading outcome is
Walrasian if all buyers with valuations above p w and all sellers with costs below p w are able to trade. Our main result characterizes the trading outcome with small : With ! 0, all trades happen at the price p w (Theorem 5), and the trading outcome becomes the Walrasian outcome (Corollary 6). 1 We start by considering the case where sellers are homogeneous and their costs are zero. Buyers are heterogeneous and their valuations are distributed between zero and one. The market clearing price is zero; at any price p above zero, there are more sellers than buyers in the in ‡ow who are willing to trade. When showing convergence to the market clearing price, we proceed in two steps. First, if sellers set a price p above 0, some sellers will be rationed : the probability of trading at some time during their life is strictly smaller than one. We show that sellers must remain rationed at the noncompetitive price p in the limit with converging to zero. Second, if the others are o¤ering p > 0, a seller who o¤ers any price p 0 below p becomes certain to trade in the limit. This is because buyers with valuations between p 0 and p can never trade with the other sellers. Therefore, these types of buyers make up a strictly positive share of the pool of buyers, and in every single period the seller has a strictly positive chance of being matched with such a buyer. When becomes zero, it becomes certain that the seller will be able to trade some time during his lifetime before he is forced to exit the market. Together, the two steps imply that in the limit a marginal decrease of the price p increases the trading probability discretely to one, i.e., the elasticity of the trading probability at any p above zero becomes "in…nite" when the exit rate vanishes. Therefore, prices set by sellers have to be zero in the limit.
The convergence result is not immediate. Diamond (1971) shows that even with small trading frictions, sellers can have considerable market power: Given any common price p set by sellers and any level of , buyers with valuations v > p are willing to pay a premium of (v p ) to save on waiting costs. This allows all sellers to mark up the price p and provides incentives for them to increase their prices. With homogeneous buyers this implies that sellers o¤er monopolistic prices in the unique equilibrium. This is known as the Diamond paradox. In our model, prices are not monopolistic because buyers are heterogeneous 2 . Sellers are rationed at any price p > 0 and they have a countervailing incentive to decrease their price to reach additional buyers with valuations below p .
By giving sellers all the bargaining power, we isolate this incentive from the additional incentives in the existing literature that are due to intermediate bargaining power and direct competition between sellers (see the discussion in Section 5.2). To clearly isolate the market forces of demand and supply in a simple and tractable model is the main contribution of this paper.
When considering heterogeneous sellers with costs distributed between zero and one, it is necessary to account for price dispersion, since sellers with di¤erent costs might want to set di¤erent prices. Price dispersion implies an additional complication: With dispersed prices, sellers can set prices in such a way as to provide buyers with incentives to accept high prices (by setting high prices most of the time) while balancing the distribution of buyers to avoid accumulating low valuation buyers (by setting low prices some of the time). The main part of the proof with heterogeneous sellers consists of showing that sellers have no incentives to set prices in this way. Instead, a version of the law of one price holds with vanishing , and price dispersion ceases to exist. Given the law of one price, we show that prices must be competitive by the fact that sellers (buyers) would be rationed at prices that are too high (too low).
This model di¤ers from the existing literature mainly by positing price setting by sellers. Its basic framework is similar to Gale (1987) , who introduced the steady-state dynamic matching and bargaining game with heterogeneous agents, pairwise matching, and an exogeneous in ‡ow of agents. Recent models like those of Inderst (2001) and Shneyerov (2007a, 2007b ) extended this framework to private information. 3 Following McAfee (1993) and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007b) , we introduce an exogeneous exit rate. Section 5 contains a discussion of our assumptions and of the existing literature.
Finally, in Section 5.3, we use our model to discuss the meaning of "demand" in a dynamic market. During our analysis, we employ two concepts of demand at price p: "Static demand" is exogeneous and it is de…ned as the mass of buyers in the in ‡ow who have a valuation above p. "Dynamic demand" is endogeneous and it is de…ned as the sellers'probability of trading at a price p. It depends on the stock of buyers in the market and on their outside option, i.e., their ability of intertemporal substution. We relate these two concepts to a recent econometric study of demand in a dynamic market by Nevo and Hendel (2006) . This paper begins with a section introducing the model. The model and the proof technique are illustrated by considering the case of homogeneous sellers. We characterize the unique equilibrium in pure strategies by the Lerner pricing formula. The elasticity of demand is endogenously determined, and a simple argument implies that with vanishing sellers set competitive prices. Then we go on to the heterogeneous case and show convergence to the competitive outcome. A detailed discussion of our modeling choices and extensions is provided in Section 5. In particular, we show which additional assumptions the existing literature makes to ensure convergence, and how these assumptions translate into forces towards market clearance.
Model
There is a continuum of buyers and sellers who interact in a repeated market over an The in ‡ow of buyers and the in ‡ow of sellers have a mass of one each. The distribution of valuations among buyers in the in ‡ow is exogeneously given by some c.d.f. G B ( ) and similarly, the distribution of costs is given by some distribution G S ( ). We assume that the density g B ( ) is continuous and strictly positive, so 1 G B (v) is strictly decreasing. 4 The functions G S and 1 G B can be interpreted as the supply and demand functions for a Walrasian Auctioneer who clears the market in each period separately. Therefore, we call G S ( ) the static supply and 1 G B ( ) the static demand. 4 We do not assume that the distribution of sellers' costs, G S ( ), is strictly increasing, since in the next section we want to give an example with homogeneous sellers who have all costs c = 0.
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The price at which static supply and demand are equal is called the Walrasian price and is denoted by p w :
The market clearing price is uniquely de…ned since the right-hand side (supply) is weakly increasing and the left-hand side (demand) is strictly decreasing in the price.
A market constellation is a vector = p ( ) ; r ( ) ; S ( ) ; B ( ) ; M ; which summarizes the endogeneous parameters of the market: p (c) 2 [0; 1] is the price o¤ered by a seller of type c; r (v) 2 [0; 1] is the highest price accepted by a buyer of type v (see below); S ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of costs in the pool of sellers; B ( ) is the distribution function of buyers'valuations, and M is the total mass of buyers in the pool that is equal to the total mass of sellers in a steady-state. 5 We say that a market constellation constitutes an equilibrium if strategies are mutually optimal given the distribution of types and if the distribution of types in the pool is consistent with the trading strategies and the exogeneous in ‡ow.
First we consider the sellers'decision problem. Let us denote by D (pj ; ) the probability that the buyer in any given pair accepts an o¤er p, given the market constellation and the exit rate . For future reference, we refer to D ( j ; ) as the dynamic demand, which depends on the endogeneous distribution of buyers'types in the pool and on their strategies. 6 To simplify the notation, we keep …xed while presenting the model, and from now on we suppress the dependency on . Given D ( j ), we derive the probability that a seller is able to trade at some time during his lifetime, q S (pj ), the so called lifetime trading probability. We can derive q S (pj ) recursively from
Since there is no discounting, the seller does not care about when he conducts a trade but only about whether he is able to trade before he must exit. 7 Therefore, the expected payo¤ to a seller when o¤ering a price p is the product of the selling probability and the 5 For the analysis, we assume that all functions under consideration are measurable. With M being the set of measurable functions f :
; see below. 7 Including a discount rate would not change results, see the discussion in Section 5.1.
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pro…t at the price p,
We require that p (c) 2 arg max U S ( ; cj ) for all c in equilibrium.
To derive the optimal search strategy of a buyer, note that his decision problem is equivalent to the problem of optimal sampling without recall from a known and constant distribution of prices. For this problem, it is well known that the optimal solution can be described by a reservation price r, such that a price o¤er p is accepted if and only if p r (see, e.g., McMillan and Rothschild (1994) ). The payo¤ to a buyer of type v with a reservation price r depends on the expected price o¤er, E [pjp r; ] ; and the probability to trade at some time during his lifetime. 8 With S (rj ) denoting the probability to receive an acceptable o¤er p r in any single period, we can derive the lifetime trading probability q B (rj ) just as we derived q S (pj ):
Payo¤s for buyers are given by
Let V B (vj ) max r U B (r; vj ) be the maximized expected lifetime payo¤. At the optimal reservation price r (v) buyers must be indi¤erent between acceptance and rejection,
We restrict attention to stationary equilibria in which the pool of traders does not change over time. Suppose the total mass of sellers and the distribution of their costs at the beginning of a period is given by M and S ( ), respectively, and suppose that the trading strategies are r ( ) and p ( ). Then the mass of sellers at the end of the period is the sum of the entering sellers and the initial sellers who neither traded nor died, i.e., the mass of sellers having costs below c is
8 Let E [pjp r; ] = r if the probability of p r is zero.
7
Now, M is a steady-state mass and S ( ) is a steady-state distribution of sellers if and only if the pool at the end of the period is the same as the pool at the beginning, i.e., if
for all c. Also, for S ( ) to be a c.d.f., it has to be the case that its value at c = 1 is normalized to one, S (1) = 1. For buyers, a steady state requires that the mass at the end of the period is equal to the mass at the beginning:
Summing up, we de…ne an equilibrium to be a constellation that satis…es the above conditions:
De…nition 1 An equilibrium consists of an optimal pair of strategies and a corresponding steady-state pool, i.e., = p ( ) ; r ( ) ; S ( ) ; B ( ) ; M must be such that
3. steady-state conditions (6) and (7) hold for all c and v, and B (1) = S (1) = 1.
Homogeneous Sellers: Existence and Characterization
In this section we analyze the case in which all sellers have zero costs so that the static supply function G S ( ) is ‡at. Static demand 1 G B ( ) is strictly decreasing. In this case, the market clearing price p w is zero. In addition, 1 G B ( ) is assumed to be continuously di¤erentiable and strictly concave. 9 We want to prove that the prices set by sellers converge to zero. The proof's two important building blocks are that (a) sellers are rationed at non-market clearing prices and that (b) in the limit, sellers can increase their trading probability strictly by decreasing their price only marginally. In addition to convergence, we show that we can characterize the equilibrium price o¤er by the Lerner formula. We use this formula to prove the existence of a unique equilibrium price 10 .
9 Concavity allows us to show existence because we can utilize the su¢ ciency of the …rst order condition to derive the optimal price. Concavity is not needed for the characterization result.
1 0 Note that the equilibrium de…nition does not allow sellers of the same type to set di¤erent prices. We discuss price dispersion at the end of the next section, showing how to extend the characterization proof for heterogeneous sellers to the homogeneous sellers case with mixed strategies (prices).
Theorem 1 If all sellers have zero costs, then 1. there exists an equilibrium for all 2 (0; 1), 2. for given , the equilibrium price p = p (0) is unique;
3. the price p decreases if decreases, 4. and the price o¤ er in the limit is competitive, lim !0 p = 0.
In the remaining section we prove the theorem. Some of the details are relegated to the appendix.
Characterization of the Market
First, we want to characterize the market constellation in which (i) sellers o¤er some price p , (ii) buyers use optimal reservation prices, and (iii) the pool is in a steady-state. 
To characterize the steady state pool, note that buyers with valuations below p can never trade, but instead they stay in the pool until they die. 
and
The distribution of sellers is trivially given by S (cjp ) = 1 for all c.
By construction, (p ) satis…es equilibrium conditions (2) and (3). If, in addition, p maximizes the pro…t of the sellers, we have found an equilibrium. Therefore (p ) is an equilibrium constellation if and only if p 2 arg max U S ( ; 0j (p )). As we will see, such a price exists for every ; and this price is unique. However, before we move to this point, will …rst consider the equilibrium price when becomes small.
Convergence
We show that prices must become zero when vanishes. The main portion of this task is to derive the limiting lifetime trading probabilities at p and at any p 0 below it. (Trading probabilities away from the limit are not important here and we will derive them only in the next section.)
If all sellers o¤er p ; then their lifetime trading probability q S is simply the mass of entering buyers with valuations above p . The reason for this is as follows: In a steadystate the mass of buyers who trade must be equal to the mass of sellers who trade. 11 The mass of buyers who trade is 1 G B (p ), because only those buyers with valuations above p will …nd an acceptable price o¤er. The mass of sellers who trade is q S because each seller trades with probability q S ; and there is a mass one of sellers who enter the market. Thus, we get 12
For any price p 0 strictly below p , the lifetime trading probability q S can be derived from the per period trading probability D. We can …nd a lower bound on the per period 1 1 We prove this formally in Lemma 2, page 17. 1 2 In the previous paragraphs we de…ned (p ) for a …xed . Here, we vary , so we now explicitly include it as an argument in the functions. trading probability, which is also independent of :
Two observations allow us to derive the bound: First, all buyers with valuations between p 0 and p will accept p 0 . Therefore, the trading probability D is at least as large as the share of buyers in the pool who have valuations v 2 [p 0 ; p ]. Second, the share of these buyers in the pool is at least as large as their share in the in ‡ow: if none of the other types trade, the distribution of types in the pool must be simply the distribution of types in the in ‡ow. Otherwise, if some of the other types do trade, then their share must be even higher in the pool than in the in ‡ow. 13 Given the bound on the per period trading probability, let us derive the limiting trading probability at the price p 0 , q S (p 0 ):
Since static demand is strictly falling, (12) implies that the trading probability D (p 0 ) is strictly positive. So a seller has a strictly positive probability to trade at p 0 in any given period. When the exit rate converges to zero, the seller can sample for an increasing number of periods. Therefore, the lifetime trading probability at p 0 becomes one:
Now, we can see why prices must converge to zero: The trading probability at any price p is independent of and equal to 1 G B (p ) . If p is not market clearing, then the trading probability is below one, see (11) . However, the probability of trading at any p 0 below p converges to one when becomes zero, see (13) . Hence, for p 0 close to p and for small enough, a deviation from p to p 0 is pro…table. The observation that in the limit even the slightest decrease from p to p 0 increases q S to one is equivalent to saying that the elasticity of q S becomes in…nite for all p > 0.
Formally, take a vanishing sequence of exit rates Let the "deviation price" p 0 be such that p 0 is strictly below p. From (13), the lifetime trading probability at p 0 converges to one. The limiting payo¤ at p 0 are therefore
Thus, if p is not competitive, then for p 0 close to p and for k 0 small enough, pro…ts at p 0 are strictly larger than pro…ts at the equilibrium price p k 0 . This is a contradiction to the de…nition of p k 0 . Hence, the limit p of the subsequence must be zero as claimed. Since the subsequence was chosen arbitrarily, the limit price for every convergent subsequence must be zero and thus the limit of the sequence itself must be zero.
Remarks on the Intuition
A change in changes the composition of the pool and the incentives of the traders at the same time. One cannot therefore derive an intuition by keeping either of the two …xed.
For example, an intuition that looks only at the change of the pool might go as follows:
"If all sellers o¤er a common price p > 0, then, in the limit with ! 0, buyers with valuations below p will accumulate and the pool will consist almost entirely of these buyers. Therefore, sellers can no longer expect to sell at p ; and hence they decrease their price." The problem with this intuition is that at the same rate at which the pool consists of buyers with lower valuations, sellers become more patient. Indeed, these two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other such that the relevant lifetime trading probability q S (p )
is independent of : it is q S (p j ) = 1 G B (p ) for all , see (11) .
The true reason that sellers want to decrease their price with ! 0 is that it becomes increasingly likely that they will …nd a buyer with a valuation between p 0 and p -even if p 0 is just slightly below p . This increase in the matching probability stems from the fact that sellers can sample more often from the pool. This increase is not due to a change in the pool by the accumulation of low valuation buyers. Even if the distribution B of buyers in the pool remained the same as the distribution G B in the in ‡ow, the sellers'trading probability at p 0 would become one; see the derivation of (12) . Therefore, intuition derived solely from the change of the pool misses one of the main driving forces for convergence. 14 
Existence and Characterization of the Equilibrium Price
We now prove the existence of an equilibrium for a given by constructing it explicitly.
This also allows us to characterize the equilibrium price and to show that this price is unique. Recall that p is an equilibrium price if and only if p 2 arg max U S ( ; 0j (p )).
To solve this maximization problem, we …rst narrow down the set of candidate prices.
In particular, only prices in the interval between zero and the highest reservation price can be optimal, i.e., the optimal price must be in (0; r (1jp )): For prices outside this interval, pro…ts are zero, while pro…ts are strictly positive for prices inside it (since at least some buyers accept such a price). The maximization problem is further simpli…ed by the observation that the payo¤ U S (p; 0j (p )) is continuously di¤erentiable in p on this interval and strictly concave. We will show continuous di¤erentiability below.
Concavity is shown in the appendix, and this property follows from the assumption that static demand 1 G B ( ) is concave. Together, the two observations imply that the optimal price is characterized by the …rst order condition, i.e., we have found an equilibrium price if and only if
Rewriting the …rst order condition, 15 yields the well-known Lerner Formula
where
. This is the elasticity of dynamic demand D ( j (p )) which accounts for the possibility of buyers to substitute intertemporally. The term (1 ) q S (p j (p )) p can be interpreted as the dynamic opportunity costs of selling the good: Not selling today and o¤ering the good at a price p from tomorrow onwards yields expected pro…ts of (1 ) q S (p j (p )) p . Hence, the right-hand side is the relative mark up of p over the dynamic opportunity costs.
The Lerner formula (14) can be written in terms of static demand 1 G B ( ) by solving for the lifetime trading probability q S ( j (p )) and the elasticity" (p j (p )).
We already know the probability q S from (11). The dynamic elasticity" can also be derived very easily. It is equal to the static elasticity scaled up by 1 :
where the elasticity of static demand
. To see why 1 5 See the appendix for the algebraic manipulations.
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this is the case, we need to know the dynamic demand D and its derivative. To derive demand, we de…ne v (pjp ) as the lowest type who accepts the price p: v (pjp ) inf fv; 1jr (vjp ) pg. Since r (vjp ) is given by (8) , this type is
The set of buyers who accept a price p is the set of buyers with valuations above v (pjp ).
We know the distribution of buyers types'from (10), and the derivative of dynamic demand is
From the characterization of D (pj (p )) and its derivative, the formula (15) for the elasticity" (p j (p )) follows. Note also that the derivative of the dynamic demand is continuous and in particular, the dynamic demand has no kink at p . This might be surprising at …rst but it follows intuitively from the observation that a seller who decreases his price wins buyers with valuations below p who never trade and who accumulate at a rate proportional to 1 , while a seller who increases his price looses buyers who would rather wait for the next period and he looses the types of these buyers at a rate v 0 (pjp ) = 1 . Finally, continuous di¤erentiability of D implies that payo¤s U S are continuously di¤erentiable as assumed in the beginning of this section (since
1 ; see the de…nitions of q S and U S , (2) and (3)).
Our knowledge of q S and" allows us to rewrite the Lerner formula (14) as 16
The remaining parts of the theorem now follow: The existence of a solution p is implied by the intermediate value theorem, since both sides of the equation are continuous. Given p , we can construct an equilibrium constellation = (p ) from (8), (9), and (10).
This proves the existence. The uniqueness and monotonicity of the solution follows from 1 6 Substituting " and q s , we get
. Then, we cancel p on the LHS and multiply both sides by p .
the concavity of the static demand (1 G): Note that the right-hand side is decreasing in p , since its derivative has the sign of
where, by the concavity of 1 G B , g 0 is strictly positive. The left-hand side is obviously increasing in p . Together, there can be only one p for which the equality holds. Let this unique price be p . The monotonicity of the terms of the rewritten Lerner formula also implies that the solution p must be increasing in . If p were decreasing in , then our previous discussion of the signs of the change in p would imply that then the right-hand side would increase in ; while the left-hand side would decrease in -so the equality would not hold for di¤erent .
We can use the Lerner Formula to give an alternative proof of convergence. Let p k 0 again be a convergent subsequence of prices with limit p. Then, if p > 0, the inverse elasticity on the right-hand side of the Lerner formula converges to zero: the dynamic elasticity" is equal to the static elasticity " ( p) times 1 . Since the static elasticity " ( p) is constant and positive, the inverse dynamic elasticity becomes zero,
The relative mark up on the left-hand side of the Lerner Formula, however, does not converge to zero since the trading probability q S k 0 ( p) is bounded away from one since p is not market clearing. Thus, the Lerner formula cannot hold unless p is zero. This alternative proof illustrates again how rationing sellers at non-market clearing prices is essential for convergence. However, one needs to …rst derive the Lerner Formula and this proof is therefore not as direct as the comparison of the lifetime trading probabilities, which we used in our previous proof.
Heterogeneous Sellers
We now consider heterogeneous sellers. With heterogeneous sellers, we need to account for price dispersion. The main economic contribution of this section is to illustrate the market forces that imply that price dispersion ceases in the limit and that the law of one price holds. At the end of Section 4.2 we show how to use our characterization result with heterogeneous sellers to analyze price dispersion in the case of homogeneous sellers.
Technically, an equilibrium can no longer be characterized by a single price but only by a price function. The existence proof is therefore fairly involved and we relegate it to the appendix.
To characterize the equilibria in the limit, we will look at a strictly decreasing sequence of exit rates which converge to zero, lim k!1 k = 0. In the …rst subsection that follows, we will show that for every such k an equilibrium exists. We will also show the 15 monotonicity of the equilibrium strategies p and r . The reader who is not interested in these more technical details might wish to jump directly to the second subsection. There, we select one equilibrium for each k; which gives us a sequence of equilibria f k g 1 k=1 . We show that for every such sequence, the support of prices at which trade happens shrinks to a singleton, and hence, a law of one price holds. We then show that this one price must be the Walrasian price p w , which is stated in the second theorem. Convergence to the Walrasian Allocation follows as a corollary.
Existence and Preliminary Characterization
In this section, we prepare the analysis of the model with heterogeneous sellers. Now, both, G S ( ) and G B ( ) are strictly increasing and we assume that they have continuous densities g S ( ) and g B ( ). We need no longer assume that 1 G B ( ) is concave. We …rst prove that prices p ( ) and reservation prices r ( ) are monotone. Then, we show that for every monotone strategy combination p ( ) and r ( ) (not just equilibrium strategies), there exists a steady-state pool of traders. We also show that for every monotone strategy combination and for every corresponding steady-state pool, the transfers collectively made by sellers are equal to the transfers received by buyers, and the total mass of sellers who trade is equal to the total mass of buyers who trade. Finally, we prove that an equilibrium exists for all . All proofs are collected in the appendix.
The …rst lemma shows that the reservation prices of buyers are monotone increasing in their valuations, and the prices set by sellers are monotone increasing in costs, if they have costs below the highest accepted price r (1). Since prices of sellers with costs above r (1) are never accepted, they have no impact on the equilibrium. Thus, the prices set by these sellers can be changed such that these prices are monotone as well without a¤ecting the equilibrium conditions.
Lemma 1 If
= p ; r ; S ; B ; M is a steady-state equilibrium then, de…ning
= p; r ; S ; S ; M is a steady-state equilibrium, andp and r are monotone.
Note, if all equilibrium constellations with monotone price functions are competitive, then also all equilibrium constellations in which sellers'prices might be non-monotone 16 above r (1) must be competitive. The restriction to monotone p and r, however, makes the analysis a lot easier.
It can also be shown that reservation prices must be strictly increasing with a slope contained between and 1. We de…ne r( ) as the set of functions with such a bounded slope, and we de…ne p( ) as the set of monotone prices. For every strategy combination of p and r from p( ) and r( ) , we can use a …xed point argument to prove that a pool of traders can be found such that the steady-state conditions hold.
Theorem 2 For every strategy combination (p ( ) ; r ( )) 2 p( ) r( ) there is a pool B ( ), S ( ), and M such that the steady-state conditions (6) and (7) hold.
Thus, the steady-state conditions do not restrict the strategy set any further. In models without an exit rate, this is not true, and for some strategies, a steady-state pool fails to exist. In the latter case, the steady-state assumption implies a restriction on the strategies (see the discussion of models with in…nitely lived players in Section 5.2).
Intuition suggests that in a steady-state the mass of buyers who trade is equal to the mass of sellers who trade. In addition, the expected payments made by buyers should be equal to the expected payments received by sellers. Indeed, straightforward manipulation of the steady-state conditions shows that this is the case. To state the next lemma, let be the set of all constellations such that, given the pricing strategy p ( ) and reservation prices r ( ), the pool S ; B and M satis…es the steady-state conditions. Lemma 2 Mass Balance. Expected payments and the mass of expected trades are equal on both sides of the market, i.e., for all 2 :
As discussed in Lauermann (2006b), mass balance does not need to hold in models in which the in ‡ow is not exogeneous as in De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) .
Finally, an application of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem shows an equilibrium exists that for every .
Theorem 3 For every , there exists an equilibrium constellation .
The Law of One Price
To de…ne the support of prices at which trade takes place, let h k be the highest accepted price, h k r k (1) ; and let l k be the lowest o¤ered price, l k p k (0). Now, we state the law of one price.
Theorem 4 For every sequence of steady-state equilibria with h k r k (1) and l k p k (0) :
In the remainder of this section we prove the theorem by contradiction, using the following line of reasoning: Suppose that, contrary to the theorem, there is some (sub-)sequence, indexed by k 0 along which the cuto¤ prices h k 0 and l k 0 converge to two di¤erent
As stated in the introduction, to sustain price dispersion in equilibrium, two opposing conditions must hold: For During this and subsequent sections, we often refer to the lifetime trading probabilities of types, and we denote these probabilities by capital letters. For this we de…ne Q S (cj ; ) q S (p (c) j ; ) and similarly Q B (vj ; ) q B (r (v) j ; ). 17 We abbreviate by using
First, the trading probability at intermediate reservation prices strictly below h must not converge to one. Otherwise, accepting h would not be optimal for a buyer with a valuation of one: By rejecting h and waiting for a lower price instead, he would still trade with a probability of one but at a lower price, which makes him better o¤. Since buyers with valuations strictly below h can only trade at prices below h, this implies that their trading probabilities must not converge to one: 1 7 Note that we vary the exit rate, and that we therefore include in the arguments.
Lemma 3 Trading probabilities of intermediate types of buyers are bounded away from one:
The next two lemmas are the implication of this upper bound on the trading probability. First, payo¤s to buyers are bounded. In particular, the limiting payo¤s of the intermediate types are strictly smaller than (v l), since Lemma 3 implies that they cannot become certain to trade at l (or better). Therefore, they accept prices above l in the limit.
Lemma 4 Intermediate types of buyers accept prices above l in the limit:
The second implication of the upper bound on trading probabilities is that intermediate types make up a strictly positive share of the pool in the limit. Intuitively, buyers who are less likely to trade stay in the pool for a longer time and make up a larger share of the pool than those who are more likely to trade:
Lemma 5 Intermediate types of buyers make up a strictly positive share in the limit:
Proof of the Theorem: Take any intermediate type v 0 2 (l; h). Suppose a seller having zero costs o¤ers a price equal to the reservation price of this type, r k 0 (v 0 ). All buyers with valuations above v 0 accept these prices. By Lemma 5, the share of these buyers is strictly positive in the limit. Therefore, the lifetime trading probability of the seller becomes one when ! 0,
By Lemma 4 the limiting reservation price of v 0 is larger than l. Therefore, the limiting payo¤ to the zero cost seller who o¤ers r k 0 (v 0 ) will be strictly larger than l. If instead the seller would o¤er the prescribed equilibrium price p k 0 (0), his payo¤s would be at most l in the limit. So, for k large enough, p k 0 (0) is no longer payo¤ maximizing and the seller would want to deviate and increase his price to r k 0 (v 0 ) instead. Therefore f k 0 g cannot be a sequence of equilibrium constellations, yielding the desired contradiction. QED:
Remark on the Intuition for the Law of One Price
There is an easy but misleading intuition for the law of one price that goes as follows:
"There can be no price dispersion in the limit because buyers become more patient with ! 0. Therefore, they would reject all high o¤ers and only accept low prices." This overlooks the fact that the distribution of prices is endogeneous and might change with to keep buyers accepting high o¤ers. Note that our proof is constructed to …rst show how prices must (and can) be set to actually make buyers accept high prices. Then, the reasoning that such price dispersion is not sustainable is more subtle, and it involves the sellers' incentives to increase prices.
Convergence to the Walrasian Price
Theorem 4 tells us that in the limit, all trades happen at a single price. The next theorem
shows that this price is the Walrasian price:
Theorem 5 For every sequence of steady-state equilibria, prices converge to the Walrasian Price:
Given the "law of one price," it is su¢ cient to prove that one of the two boundary prices l k or h k converges to p w . Let us prove lim k!1 h k = p w . To do so, we take some convergent subsequence of fh k g 1 k=1 , indexed by k 0 , and call its limit p c . First, we show that all sellers with costs below p c must be able to trade in the limit. Second, we show that also all buyers with valuations above p c must be able to trade in the limit. Furthermore, the market clearing price is the only price at which all buyers with valuations above this price and all sellers with costs below this price can trade.
Therefore, it must be the case that the limit price p c is equal to p w for every convergent subsequence. And thus, p w must be the limit for the sequence itself.
The …rst lemma states that the trading probabilities of sellers become one if their costs are below p c . The trading probabilities become zero otherwise:
Lemma 6 For every convergent subsequence fh k 0 g with lim k 0 !1 h k 0 = p c :
and lim
The proof is quite intuitive: Observe that along the subsequence, for any p 0 < p c , buyers with v 2 (p 0 ; l k 0 ) do not trade, but accumulate instead in the market. 18 Hence, we know that a seller who o¤ers any price p 0 below p c becomes sure to trade in the limit. Since the equilibrium price o¤er p k 0 (c) converges to p c by de…nition, the trading probability at p k 0 (c) must converge to one as well, and we have Q S k 0 (c)
and even the buyer with the highest reservation price will not accept such prices when k 0 becomes small, since r k 0 (1) ! p c . Thus, sellers with costs above p c will not …nd a buyer in the limit, and the second part of the lemma follows.
Similarly, we can show that the trading probabilities of buyers with valuations v > p c must converge to one. If not, some buyers would be willing to accept prices strictly above p c , contradicting the de…nition of h k 0 :
Lemma 7 For every convergent subsequence fh k 0 g with
Proof of Theorem 5: Lemma 6 and 7 imply that in the limit the trading probabilities of sellers and buyers are given by the step functions 1 c p w and 1 v p v . So we know the mass of players who will trade with k 0 ! 0:
As veri…ed in Lemma 2, in every equilibrium k 0 , the mass of buyers who trade must be equal to the mass of sellers who trade, i.e.,
The unique price which satis…es this equality is the market clearing price p w , and hence, all subsequences h k 0 and l k 0 converge to p w . Since all subsequences converge to the same point, the sequence of prices h k itself converges p w QED:
An immediate corollary of Lemma 6 and 7 is that in the limit those and only those sellers with costs below p w and buyers with valuations above p w trade:
Corollary 6 For every sequence of steady-state equilibria, the outcomes converge to a Walrasian allocation, i.e.,
Proof : Rewrite the Lemmas, substituting p c = p w QED:
The Law of One Price for Homogeneous Sellers
In the section with homogeneous sellers, we only analyzed equilibria in which all sellers o¤er the same price p . What about equilibria in which price o¤ers are distributed over we can conveniently analyze equilibria in mixed strategies. In particular, we can use our results about heterogeneous sellers and show that p (i) converges to p w = 0 for all
To accomplish this, the proof with heterogeneous sellers could be used almost verbatim. We would …rst show the law of one price, i.e., the lowest price in the support of price o¤ers converges to the highest accepted price. Here, we could simply repeat the earlier proof. Then, we would show that l k and h k converge to zero. Here, we would need to make small adjustments in the notation since there are no sellers with costs c < p w = 0.
Discussion
We discuss …rst the setup and the robustness of our result. Then we look at the relation to the existing literature. Finally, we discuss the interpretation of demand in a dynamic 22 context.
Discussion of the Setup
Matching Technology. We assume that all entering buyers and sellers are matched into pairs, and that no trader remains unmatched. This assumption allows for the derivation of the lifetime trading probabilities in a very convenient way. Recall that with homogeneous sellers and a common price o¤er p , the lifetime trading probability was equal to the mass of buyers with valuations above p , q S = 1 G B (p ); see (11) .
This simple formulation allows us to directly tell the story of rationing, by connecting the sellers' trading probability with the static demand function and by observing that the trading probability is less than one whenever the price p is not market clearing.
Alternative matching technologies would make the solution of the model less instructive, but they would not change the qualitative results. All that we need for our characterization in the limit is that whenever a set of buyers makes up a strictly positive share of the total pool then the probability that a seller is matched with these buyers is positive.
No Discounting. The exit rate acts like a discount rate by introducing search costs, and in particular, by making these search costs depend on the type: High valuation buyers have more to loose and are more eager to trade. Qualitative results would not change by adding pure time discounting that is proportional to the exit rate, as, e.g., in Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007b) . However, discounting would drive a wedge between the lifetime trading probability and the discounted lifetime trading probability.
While the former can be written in the simple way discussed before, the latter discounted trading probability would be more cumbersome to derive, and would again make the model less instructive.
Price O¤ers. We restrict sellers to o¤er simple take-it-or-leave-it prices. In principle, there might be more elaborate selling mechanisms that could raise the seller's payo¤s. This is not the case in our quasilinear setup; see the work by Yilankaya (1997) , and in particular, the recent work by Mylovanov and Tröger (2007) for continuous type spaces.
Exit Rate. When modelling the evolution of the pool of traders, we follow McAfee (1993), and in particular Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007b) and assume that there is some exogeneous exit rate. The main alternative would be to assume that traders literally live in…nitely long like in Gale (1987) . The assumption that agents live in…nitely long, however, restricts the set of possible equilibria because it introduces a zero pro…t condition for sellers. This zero pro…t condition is not a limit property but it holds even away from the limit and for all levels of frictions. Also, it is independent of any further strategic considerations. Thus, models with in…nitely lived agents do not necessarily include the idea that frictions allow traders to enjoy market power in a decentralized market, and that therefore trading is ine¢ cient unless the market becomes frictionless.
To see why the zero pro…t condition holds let us look at the example from Section 3 where sellers are homogeneous and the market clearing price is zero. To start, note that agents who life in…nitely long can leave the market only through trading. Agents who do never trade accumulate in the market and have a mass of in…nity. Therefore, one needs to include an entry decision to ensure the existence of a steady-state with …nite masses. Second, and again to ensure a steady-state, the mass of entering buyers and sellers must be exactly identical and all traders who decide to enter the market must trade at some point. Now there are two possible equilibrium scenarios: In the …rst case, all buyers enter, including those with zero valuation. Because even these buyers must be able to trade, sellers must o¤er prices close to zero. Since sellers would not do so otherwise, this requires that sellers earn zero pro…ts in the …rst case. In the second case, instead of all buyers, only a mass strictly smaller than one enters. Then, to equalize the mass of entering sellers and buyers, some of the sellers must also choose to stay out of the market. However, sellers will stay out of the market only if they earn zero pro…ts. Therefore, for both cases the zero pro…t condition holds at all levels of the friction.
No Entry Stage. With in…nitely living agents, an entry decision is necessary for technical reasons. We can dispense with it here. If, however, we were to include such an entry stage in a modi…ed model, we could sustain multiple equilibria. For example, in a model with entry, there will typically be a trivial equilibrium in which no trader enters and no trade takes place. Such an equilibrium, however, might be considered unstable because it relies on the assumption that it is impossible for sellers to reach inactive buyers who chose not to enter and who accumulate outside of the pool. If sellers would, for example, be allowed to advertise their prices at some cost per ad to buyers outside the pool and if we let this cost converge to zero, the convergence result could be restored.
Asymmetric Information. Intuition suggests that asymmetric information makes the convergence result harder to attain, because bilateral bargaining between the seller and the buyer must be ine¢ cient if their costs and valuations are private information. This, however, is not the case. In Lauermann (2006a), the present model is altered by enabling sellers to observe v before making a price o¤er. Therefore, bilateral bargaining between the seller and the buyer is e¢ cient. The setup is the same in all other respects.
But, without asymmetric information, the convergence results are reversed: prices increase if the friction becomes smaller and the prices set in the limit are not competitive.
The reason for this is that price discrimination allows all types of sellers to make strictly positive pro…ts even in the limit. Therefore, marginal sellers with costs close to the market clearing price would not want to trade with marginal buyers, since trading with these buyers would yield only zero pro…ts to them. 19 The negative result in Lauermann (2006a) not only illustrates the pro-competitive e¤ect of asymmetric information, but it also shows that the convergence result obtained here is not immediately determined from the set-up. For example, low valuation buyers " ‡ood" the market in both variants of the model. Therefore, accumulation of these types cannot be crucial for the results.
Extensions: Non-Steady States and Multiple Goods. It is possible to extend the model in several directions. In particular, one could assume that entry happens only once, in the …rst period, and that there is no subsequent entry as in Moreno and Wooders (2002) . 20 This would make the pool non-stationary. Similarly, one could extend the model to allow traders to supply and demand several goods as in Gale (2000) 
Existing Literature and Other Market Clearing Forces
We have argued that rationing and the incentives to reach out for additional buyers are the essential ingredients that guarantee an e¢ cient outcome in the limit. In the existing literature, however, assumptions can be found that give sellers additional incentives to decrease their prices. In the main strand of the literature, 21 within each pair, both sides of the market have a chance to make an o¤er. In recent models, only sellers can make the o¤er, but buyers have the chance to simultaneously receive several o¤ers from competing sellers. 22 For illustration, take a model with homogeneous sellers, where the market clearing price is zero. Suppose that sellers set a common price p > 0; even for small . As we know, not all sellers will be able to trade at this price and their lifetime trading probability is bounded away from one. This implies furthermore that their pro…ts are strictly smaller than p . Now consider a model with a positive chance that a seller competes directly against the o¤er of another seller. In this case, there is additional pressure on prices: given the common price level p , any incremental decrease of the price increases the trading probability strictly by undercutting the rivals'prices. Because expected future pro…ts are strictly below p , this increase of the trading probability is pro…table. Similarly, consider a model in which buyers can make o¤ers with some probability themselves. Note that, in order to avoid rationing, a seller will accept a low price o¤er p 0 from a buyer even if it is considerably less than p . Therefore, buyers have the possibility to trade at that price p 0 in the future when it is their turn to make an o¤er. Moreover, if is close enough to zero, buyers can almost certainly do so. This outside option of trading at a much lower price in the future makes them unwilling to accept an o¤er p from the seller. Therefore, sellers are forced to decrease their price o¤er in order to make it acceptable.
We can distinguish three forces that push prices towards the competitive level: the incentive to reach out to additional buyers analyzed here, the incentive to undercut the competitors, and the outside option for buyers if they have some bargaining power. Rationing on the sellers'side is the common starting point. However, there is an important qualitative di¤erence between the three forces: While the existence of additional buyers at lower prices is a basic feature implied by nothing more than falling demand, the possibility of directly competing o¤ers or the distribution of bargaining power between traders depends on the …ne details of the situation and of the model. By showing to what extent the convergence result is independent on these latter details, we provide evidence for the robustness of the prediction that decentralized trading is e¢ cient. 
Demand and Supply in a Dynamic Market
What is "demand" in a dynamic market? There are at least three empirically appealing notions of demand at price p: (i) The mass of buyers in the market who are present today and who place a value above p on the good, (ii) the mass of buyers in the market who are present today and who would actually buy the good at a price p, and (iii) the mass of buyers who buy the good at price p if this is the only price of the good in all past and future times. In our model, these notions correspond to (i) the distribution of types in the pool 1 In a dynamic market, however, these three notions are di¤erent as we have seen and one might ask which one is "the right one." Our analysis suggests the following: If a researcher is interested in a market with small frictions, then static supply and demand might be right. We have shown that in the limit, prices are equal to the market clearing price p w , which is determined only by static supply and demand. This con…rms the view put forward by Gale (1987) . 23 Away from the limit, however, we have seen how both, The three notions matter in empirical research. For example, Nevo and Hendel (2006) study demand for laundry detergents. The possibility of storing laundry detergents makes demand more sensitive to temporary price changes than it would be otherwise.
Roughly, they estimate dynamic demand by looking at the true revenue at di¤erent prices. Then, they estimate static demand, i.e., the level of demand that would emerge if the price would be constantly …xed at some p. Since this demand is unobservable, they use structural estimation by identifying the cost of storage and the distribution of types of consumers. This allows them to calculate static demand. Note that similarly in our model knowledge of the distribution of types in the pool, B , and knowledge of the waiting costs , would allow to calculate the trading probability, q S (p), which depends on static demand 1 G B . Using their estimates, they show that the dynamic elasticity of demand is much higher than the elasticity of static demand. This is consistent with our analysis. Recall, that the elasticity of dynamic demand was equal to the elasticity of static demand scaled up by 1 (see equation (15)).
Nevo and Hendel point to the relevance of the right choice of "demand": For example, when the Lerner formula is used to estimate the mark-up in an industry, then this estimate is sensitive to whether one chooses the elasticity of dynamic or static demand.
The Lerner formula plays a prominent role in merger analysis and therefore the answer to "What is demand?" has important policy implications. Although we look at the extreme case in which many …rms compete under capacity constraints, our characterization of pricing via the Lerner formula indicates that oligopolistic pricing decisions might be sensitive to the dynamic elasticity of demand. In general, our model provides a simple tool to discuss the di¤erent possible meanings of "demand" in a dynamic market. It could be interesting to extend the model to an oligopolistic market structure.
Conclusion
In our analysis, we proved the asymptotic e¢ ciency of decentralized trading. The basic forces of demand and supply are su¢ cient to provide incentives for sellers to set market clearing prices when frictions are small. In particular, our intuitive argument appealed to rationing of traders at non-market clearing prices. We have shown that with homogeneous sellers, prices can be characterized by the familiar Lerner formula, i.e., the mark up of prices over costs is proportional to the inverse elasticity of demand. Both the costs and the elasticity are endogeneous: the dynamic costs of trading for sellers include foregone future pro…ts, and the dynamic elasticity of demand includes the possibility of intertemporal substitution. When frictions become small, we see that rationing, together with the increasing elasticity of demand, implies that prices must converge to their competitive level. Finally, we have discussed how to use our model to clarify the meaning of "supply" and "demand" in a dynamic market.
A Homogeneous Sellers
We want to show that U S (p; 0j (p )) is strictly concave on [0; r (1jp )]. For this, we characterize the …rst and second derivative of q S :
for p 2 [0; p ) noting that the derivative of v (pj (p )) is 1 and 1, respectively. The
and an inspection of the above equations reveals that the …rst and second derivative of q S ( j (p )) are strictly negative. Looking at To derive the Lerner formula, note that from
where we dropped the dependency on (p ). Because the denominator of We can rewrite the nominator as
and by d (p ) < 0, we get @ @p U S ( jp ) j p=p = 0 if and only the Lerner formula (14) holds.
B Heterogeneous sellers B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we prove that we can restrict attention to a subset of (the set of measurable constellations; see Footnote 2) when analyzing equilibrium outcomes. We use this to ease notational burden, for the proof of Theorem 2, and to prepare the existence proof by restricting the set of equilibrium candidates. Let = p ; r ; S ; S ; M 2 be an equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions imply restrictions on these functions that we spell out now: We show that r ( ) must have a slope in [ ; 1], i.e., r ( ) is in the set
For this, note that if the value function is di¤erentiable at some pointṽ, then
is di¤erentiable atṽ as well and r 0 (ṽj ) = 1 (1 ) q B (r (ṽ) j ); hence, r 0 (ṽj ) 2
[ ; 1] at all di¤erentiability points. This restriction on the slope can be generalized to all points by rewriting the optimality condition
U B (r (b) ; b) and its symmetric analogue and by using the de…nition of U B ( ; ); see, e.g., Milgrom and Segal (2002) .
Inspecting the steady-state conditions (6) and (7), shows that M must be in 1; 1 :
30 Rewriting (7) at v = 1, with B (1) = 1; we get
from where M 2 1; 1 follows, substituting S (r ( ) j ) 1 to get the lower bound and S (r ( ) j ) 0 to get the upper bound. Similarly, one can show that the distribution functions S and B are strictly increasing with a bounded slope: Note …rst, that since the densities g S and g B are strictly positive and continuous by assumption, there
Rewriting the steady-state condition (7) shows that therefore B ( ) and S ( ) are in the set
Given monotonicity of reservation prices, we want to show monotonicity of prices p ( ). For this, we use that payo¤s satisfy the strict single crossing property. To show that this is true, note that a seller who o¤ers a price p trades with all buyers with a valuation above v (pj ) inf fv; 1jr (v) pg by monotonicity of r ( ). Therefore 
Rewriting shows that the left-hand side is equivalent to
This implies that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in costs, and hence
and this inequality can be rewritten as
By the monotone selection principle of Milgrom and Shannon (1994) , the strict single crossing property implies that all selections from the maximum correspondence arg max p U S (p; cj ) are weakly increasing. Therefore, p ( ) is weakly increasing on [0; r (1)). We cannot use optimality conditions to extend the monotonicity of p ( ) to types beyond r (1): Every price p r (1) is optimal for a type c r (1) since at every such price trading probabilities and pro…ts are zero, while at every price p < r (1) ;
pro…ts would be strictly negative. Nevertheless, we may simply assume that these types set monotone prices, and without further loss of generality, we may assume that they set prices equal to their costs.
Let + be the set of weakly increasing functions and de…ne the set~
We summarize our …ndings in a lemma. It states that every equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium~ ; which is in the set~ , changing p ( ) top ( ) on [r (1) ; 1] ; as described before:
Lemma 8 If = p ; r ; S ; S ; M is a steady-state equilibrium then, with
= p; r ; S ; S ; M is a steady-state equilibrium and~ 2~ .
Lemma 1 follows immediately.
B.2 Proof of Theorem2
See the remark following the existence proof on page 44.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Take some 2 , i.e., some strategy combination and some corresponding steadystate pool. We show the identity of trading masses by algebraic manipulation, dropping the dependency on for brevity, with c (v) = sup fc; 0jp (c) r (v)g and v (c) = inf fv; 1jr (v) p (c)g :
and similarly the identity of expected payments follows from:
B.4 Proof of Existence
Finally, we show that an equilibrium exists for every . With heterogeneous sellers, we cannot reduce the existence problem to a one-dimensional …xed point problem as we did To prepare for the …xed point theorem, we restrict the set of candidate strategies and distributions under consideration. Observing that M S ( ) corresponds to S ( ) M , the restrictions on distributions of types become now restrictions on masses, and we de…ne analogously to S and B :
and the domain of K is
Because all functions in are integrable, we use the integral norm kf ( ) 
and payo¤s are
Ex ante expected payo¤s to sellers are (p ( ) j!) ; and interim maximized payo¤s to buyers are V B (v):
Now we de…ne the operator K. The sellers'best response correspondence is de…ned as
response is given by
In analogy to the steady-state conditions, de…ne pool response operators by
where K S (cj!) is the mass of sellers at the end of the period, consisting of the in ‡ow The slope of K S ( j!) is maximal at dK S (t) = g h 1 and minimal at dK S (t) = g l + 0.
Reasoning similarly for buyers and adding our observations on the best response operators, we have that K [ ] is a self map of :
:
We want to prove that K has a …xed point ! ; using the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg …xed point theorem. The theorem states that if is a non-empty, convex, and compact subset of a locally convex Hausdor¤ space, and if K has a closed graph and nonempty, convex values, then K has a …xed point (see Aliprantis, Border, 1994, p484 
The next lemma states that reservation prices are continuous in !. With r (vj!) = v 2 5 f (x 0) is de…ned as the left hand limit, lim">0;"!0 f (x "). f (x + 0) is de…ned analogously.
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(1 ) V B (vj!) ; we need to show continuity of the value function V B ( j!). We cannot directly apply Berge's Maximum theorem since payo¤s U B (r; vj!) do not need to be continuous in !, because, for given r, the mass of sellers who o¤er p r, M S (c (rj!) j!),
can have a discontinuity. Therefore, we use the following trick : instead of choosing a reservation price r, buyers are thought of as choosing a threshold seller c x and trade with all sellers with c c x :
Proof: Given c x 2 [0; 1], let the ultimate trading probability be q B x (c x j!), with q B x (c x j!)
; and let expected prices be E x [pjc x ; !] ; if p S ( ) is ‡at at the optimal cuto¤ c x , the buyer must be indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting p S (c x ). Thus, the continuity of
Now we want to show that the pool responses K S and K B are continuous. This is the main technical challenge of the existence proof. The problem here is that we need to evaluate composite functions. In particular, to calculate the trading probability of a type v, we need to evaluate the share M S (c (r (v)) j!) M S (1j!) 1 . However, the type c who trades with v, c (r (v) j!), does not need to be continuous in !. Therefore, we need to state …rst three auxiliary lemmas to deal with the problem of composite (inverse)
functions. The …rst lemma states a partial converse to Lebesgue's bounded convergence theorem:
f are weakly increasing or if b) the family ff N g is equicontinuous.
Proof: For the …rst part: We show convergence at all interior continuity points of f which implies the statement. Let x 0 be such a point, and suppose there is some
2 jf H f x 0 j, and choose any x H 2 B " (x 0 ) such that x H > x 0 . By the monotonicity of each element f N 0 , Proof : Let x S and x B be the shares of sellers and buyers, respectively, who trade:
and note that by the same reasoning as for Lemma 2, the share of sellers and buyers who trade must be the same:
and by rewriting the steady-state conditions we get
so that x S = x B implies M S (1) = M B (0) by rewriting further: Lemma (15) . Now, we translate the ex ante optimal pricing function p into an interim optimal pricing function p: Let p ( ) be equal to p ( ) whenever p (c) is interim optimal.
For all other points c 2 [0; 1), take the right limit, p (c) = lim "!0;">0 p (c + ") ; which preserves monotonicity and interim optimality by continuity of U S ( ; ). Finally, let p (1) = lim "!0;">0 p (1 "). Recall that the set of types for which p ( ) is not interim optimal has measure zero. Changing prices on this set does therefore not change the distribution of price o¤ers so that neither steady-state conditions nor buyers'optimality conditions are a¤ected. Hence, p ( ) ; r ( ) ; S ( ) ; B ( ) ; M is a steady-state equilibrium QED:
